Is the Israeli strike on Iran over? Answer: Yes! Will Iran respond? Answer: Yes, but! Do we need to explain that? I will try to do that here First: What we saw tonight was really funny and clearly indicates the extent of the dilemma that the Zionist entity is experiencing. This is not the most that the entity can do, but this is the most that the group of developments, circumstances, and surrounding positions allowed, which took twenty-five days to think about and study. This included identifying Iran's capabilities and the expected reactions from it and the entity's capabilities to deal with these capabilities. This also included what the US administration allows on the eve of the elections, where the competition between Harris and Trump is heating up. This also includes developments in the battles in Gaza and Lebanon and the possibilities of expansion in other arenas. Second: On the subject of Iran's capabilities: It is certain that the element of fear of the Iranian reaction dominated the Israeli behavior and that it took the Iranian threats and warnings seriously and most likely what the occupation and the Americans reached about Iran's capabilities (and perhaps nuclear) prompted Netanyahu to back down from directing strikes on nuclear and oil facilities and to limit himself to targeting some military headquarters affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard and perhaps some defense systems (although the impact of the strikes does not seem significant and it can be said that they were largely unsuccessful). Third: The Israeli strike gave the United States the time it needed to complete the elections without being exposed to problems or accusations of clearly influencing the course of the electoral process, which could cause severe and prolonged damage to Zionist-American relations. Fourth: The Zionist strike in its current form gives Iran the right to respond, but without the need to rush, considering that the strike was limited and can be classified as within the current rules of engagement between the entity and Iran. Iran does not find itself forced to escalate in a way that could roll into war and that could help Trump decide the elections in his favor, which Iran does not prefer given its previous experience with Trump, who canceled the nuclear agreement, imposed harsh economic sanctions, and threatens to provide unlimited support to Netanyahu and impose more sanctions, and even requests to strike nuclear and oil facilities. Therefore, Iran will postpone its response and be satisfied with the continuous threat to the entity, while it will focus its efforts on supporting the resistance fronts and preventing the occupation from achieving a clear victory in any of them.

2024-10-26 15:00:13Z

Is the Israeli strike on Iran over?

Answer: Yes!

Will Iran respond?

Answer: Yes, but!

Do we need to explain that?

I will try to do that here

First: What we saw tonight was really funny and clearly indicates the extent of the dilemma that the Zionist entity is experiencing. This is not the most that the entity can do, but this is the most that the group of developments, circumstances, and surrounding positions allowed, which took twenty-five days to think about and study. This included identifying Iran's capabilities and the expected reactions from it and the entity's capabilities to deal with these capabilities. This also included what the US administration allows on the eve of the elections, where the competition between Harris and Trump is heating up. This also includes developments in the battles in Gaza and Lebanon and the possibilities of expansion in other arenas.

Second: On the subject of Iran's capabilities: It is certain that the element of fear of the Iranian reaction dominated the Israeli behavior and that it took the Iranian threats and warnings seriously and most likely what the occupation and the Americans reached about Iran's capabilities (and perhaps nuclear) prompted Netanyahu to back down from directing strikes on nuclear and oil facilities and to limit himself to targeting some military headquarters affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard and perhaps some defense systems (although the impact of the strikes does not seem significant and it can be said that they were largely unsuccessful).

Third: The Israeli strike gave the United States the time it needed to complete the elections without being exposed to problems or accusations of clearly influencing the course of the electoral process, which could cause severe and prolonged damage to Zionist-American relations.

Fourth: The Zionist strike in its current form gives Iran the right to respond, but without the need to rush, considering that the strike was limited and can be classified as within the current rules of engagement between the entity and Iran. Iran does not find itself forced to escalate in a way that could roll into war and that could help Trump decide the elections in his favor, which Iran does not prefer given its previous experience with Trump, who canceled the nuclear agreement, imposed harsh economic sanctions, and threatens to provide unlimited support to Netanyahu and impose more sanctions, and even requests to strike nuclear and oil facilities. Therefore, Iran will postpone its response and be satisfied with the continuous threat to the entity, while it will focus its efforts on supporting the resistance fronts and preventing the occupation from achieving a clear victory in any of them.